Legion: A Worldwide Virtual Computer
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Security
Introduction

Legion [5, 6] is a distributed computing platform that combines very large collections of independently administered machines into single, coherent environments. Like traditional operating systems, it builds on a diverse set of lower-level resources and provides convenient user abstractions, services, and policy enforcement mechanisms. The difference is that Legion's lower-level resources can include thousands of heterogeneous processors, storage systems, databases, legacy codes, and user objects, all distributed over wide-area networks spanning multiple administrative domains. Legion provides the means to pull these scattered components together into a single, object-based metacomputer that accommodates high degrees of flexibility and site autonomy.

Security is an essential part of Legion's design. In a metacomputing environment, the security problem can be divided into two main concerns: first, it must protect the metacomputer's high-level resources, services, and users from each other and from corrupted underlying resources, and, second, it must preserving the security policies of the underlying resources that form the foundation of the metacomputer and minimizing their vulnerability to attacks from the metacomputer level. The first category includes determining who can configure a metacomputer-wide scheduling service: the solution requires metacomputer-specific definitions of identity, authorization, and access control. The second category includes enforcing a policy to permits only those metacomputer users with local accounts to run jobs on a given host, which might require mapping between local identities and metacomputer identities.

To satisfy users and administrators, a full security solution must address and reconcile both of these concerns. Users must be confident that the data and computations they create within the metacomputer are adequately protected. Similarly, administrators need assurance that adding their resources to a metacomputer, making those resources more accessible and valuable to users, will not make their system more vulnerabile.

Attempting to incorporate security as an add-on late in the implementation process has proved problematic in a number of first-generation metacomputing systems (such as PVM, MPI, and Mentat), so the Legion group has addressed security issues since the earliest design phases [10]. Our metacomputing security model has three interrelated design goals:

Flexibility
The framework must adapt to many different security policies and must allow multiple policies to coexist.

Autonomy
Organizations and users within a metacomputing environment should be able to independently select and enforce their desired security policies.

Breadth
The metacomputer's architectural framework must enable a rich set of security policy features.

These goals are motivated by our view that a fundamental metacomputer characteristic is the ability to scale over and across multiple trust domains. A Legion "system" is really a federation of meta- and lower-level resources from multiple domains, each with its own separately evaluated and enforced security policies. As such, there is neither a central kernel or trusted code base to monitor and control all user-resource interactions nor a "superuser" to control all of the resources in a Legion system.

Besides these goals, our architecture must allow the implementation of a number of different security features if it is to satisfy a broad range of security needs. These include:

Isolation
Components in the metacomputer should be able to insulate themselves from security breaches in other parts of the system. This feature is particularly important in large-scale systems, where we must assume that at least some of the underlying hosts have been compromised.

Access control
Resources typically require access control mechanisms that embody authentication and authorization policies.

Identity
The ability to assert and confirm identity is an essential feature for access control, nonrepudiation, and other basic functions.

Detection and recovery
A metacomputing environment should support mechanisms for detecting intrusion and misuse of resources and for recovering after a security breach.

Communication privacy and integrity
Communication over the networks that bind the metacomputer together may need to be encrypted or protected if the networks cannot themselves be trusted.

Standards
Existing security standards such as Kerberos, ssh, DCE, etc., may need to be integrated into the metacomputing environment to satisfy local administrative policy and to handle legacy software.

The remainder of this discussion looks at how Legion's security model supports a metacomputing architecture based on our design goals. It addresses both parts of the metacomputing security problem and presents examples of mechanisms that enable a number of useful security policies and that we have designed or implemented within the architecture.

Link Description
Introduction Introduction to the Legion security model
Architecture The fundamental elements of Legion architecture
Policy Examples Meeting site and application needs
Conclusions Summary
References List of references


 

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This work partially supported by DOE grant DE-FG02-96ER25290, Logicon (for the DoD HPCMOD/PET program) DAHC 94-96-C-0008, DOE D459000-16-3C, DARPA (GA) SC H607305A, NSF-NGS EIA-9974968, NSF-NPACI ASC-96-10920, and a grant from NASA-IPG.

legion@Virginia.edu
http://legion.virginia.edu/